Designing and implementing performance measurement systems in public contracts is not an easy task. Little guidance has been available on which specific measures work better in producing certain managerial benefits. The objective of this study is to evaluate the effect of different performance measurement practices on accountability effectiveness in government contracts. The findings suggest that the overall scope of performance measurement has a positive impact on the government's ability to effectively manage contracts. More specifically, measuring costs, client impact, service timeliness and disruptions, as well as specifying the detailed processes for service delivery are associated with higher accountability effectiveness.
INTRODUCTION
In his inaugural address President Barack Obama noted that the question Americans should be asking today is not whether the government is too big or too small, but whether it works. This once again renewed attention to performance in the environment of financial crisis is especially relevant to the large number of privatized services delivered by nonprofit and forprofit organizations. While performance monitoring and measurement have a long history in the United States, these functions traditionally receive little attention by government managers (Van Slyke 2003) . Little is known about the effectiveness and relative efficacy of measures used by the public managers overseeing contract implementation (Ho 2006; Yang, Hsieh, and Li 2009 ).
The value of performance monitoring and measurement is questionable even in localities known for contracting out virtually all of their services (Prager 2008) . Nonetheless performance measurement involves critical management decisions that "operationalize policies" and "provide real-world specificity to abstract ideas and policy and are therefore of great consequence" (Cohen and Eimicke 2008, 151) .
Designing and implementing performance measurement systems in government agencies and private contracted organizations is not an easy task both theoretically and practically (Heinrich 2002) . The complex nature of performance necessitates the use of multiple measures to capture all aspects of organizational well-being. Importantly, these oversight systems are not static: some scholars recommend using detailed performance metrics initially and later simplifying them, abandoning some measures and focusing on others in order to build trust between parties (Linder 2004) . To date, little guidance is available on which specific measures work better in producing certain managerial benefits. In this connection, Cohen and Eimicke (2008, 155) note: " [t] he challenge for the managers is how to create a set of measures that is comprehensive and still limited enough to focus the organization on what is most important." Understanding how to build the optimal performance measurement practices is especially important since these activities are almost always associated with higher administrative costs (Melkers and Willoughby, 2005; Van Slyke 2003, 306; Zimmerman and Stevens 2006) . This goal is particularly relevant in the context of public-private partnerships that are subject to informational asymmetry and opportunistic behavior of private actors.
This research examines performance measurement practices with the purpose of understanding their benefits. While the long term programmatic outcomes of contracted services are often hard to verify, managerial outcomes can become useful proxies for organizational performance. Of the many managerial impacts of performance measurement this study focuses on accountability effectiveness 1 (Romzek and Johnston 2002) . Both "accountability" and "effectiveness" have been widely used in a variety of contexts and defined somewhat differently.
Our approach here is more narrow and specific to the context of government contracting. In this field, the concept of accountability effectiveness has been proposed by Johnston (2002, 2005) to describe the capacity of a government agency "to design, implement, manage, and achieve accountability for its social service contracts. This includes the state's ability to obtain timely and accurate reporting from the contractor and to use that information to evaluate performance and correct deficiencies" (Romzek and Johnston, 2005: 437) . Accountability effectiveness is different from the overall program results; instead, it refers to the managerial effectiveness in contract implementation. The first objective of this study is to evaluate the influence of the scope of performance measurement on accountability effectiveness in a sample of state and local government contracts. The second objective is to examine the effect of fifteen distinct performance measurement practices on contract accountability effectiveness. Past research suggests that some performance monitoring systems are developed unilaterally by the government agency, while others result from a collaborative dialogue between the government agencies need to stay involved in contract management since they are ultimately responsible for the outcomes (Brown and Potoski 2006; Brown, Potoski, and Van Slyke 2006; Goldsmith and Eggers 2004; Johnston and Romzek 1999; Prager 1994; Rubin 2006) . Close monitoring is necessary because (a) market competition is limited in many areas (Johnston and Girth 2010) and contractors in such markets can behave opportunistically; (b) market forces may fail to pressure the contractors to achieve some publicly important outcomes, such as equal access or legal compliance (Chan and Rosenbloom 2010) , and (c) even in competitive markets the information about the contractor and the services is often incomplete, which makes it difficult to choose the right contractor (Arrow 1984; Eisenhardt 1989) . Empirical studies of performance monitoring confirm that contractors are in fact monitored at least as intensively and closely as the programs delivered in-house (Marvel and Marvel 2007) .
Contract management involves four important policy choices, including the make-or-buy decision (or agenda setting), contracting formulation, implementation, and evaluation (Brown and Potoski 2003; Yang, Hsieh, and Li 2009) . The specific managerial activities pursued during these phases include evaluation of provider markets, political feasibility assessments, initial examination of service characteristics, pre-award conferences, ongoing contract specification, communication, data collection, reporting, inspections, sanctioning, terminations, and renewals.
Most of these activities have the goal of improving the contractor's performance.
Elements of performance measurement are in fact present in each of the four domains of contract management. During the agenda setting phase, governments consider service measurability -the ease of developing a clear set of quantifiable and reliable measures -and, accordingly, determine the feasibility of privatization (Amirkhanyan, Kim and Lambright 2007) .
The contract formulation phase involves planning for performance measurement and the preliminary measurement of the contractors' past performance (Yang, Hsieh, Li 2009 ). The latter includes investigating the contractor's reputation, reviewing its past service quality, management capacity, regulatory compliance and professional certifications. At this stage, the partners discuss the basic approaches to service delivery, standards and expectations. The contract implementation and evaluation phases often run in parallel, with the service delivery being observed, inspected, recorded, and reported upon, while the partners clarify and, sometimes, modify performance standards in a collaborative fashion (Amirkhanyan 2009 ).
The specific measures used within a contracting arrangement may be similar to those used in-house such as cost-effectiveness, service scope, quality, regulatory compliance and equal access. The measurement process, however, may be organized in different ways. First, several parties may be responsible for contract evaluation. It may be outsourced or performed directly by the government (Brown and Potoski 2006) , and may utilize data that are self-reported, observed by the government agency, or collected by a third-party (Cohen and Eimicke 2008, 151) .
Second, different contract monitoring theories may underline these efforts. One approach aspires to achieve complete contract specification and involves defining all contingencies, expectations, standards, inputs, processes, outputs, and outcomes at the onset of the contract and tracking these data through a pre-determined monitoring and reporting procedure (Milgrom and Roberts 1992) . Due to a high degree of goal ambiguity and environmental uncertainty within many service fields, achieving complete contract specification is regarded impossible (Brown, Potoski and Van Slyke 2006; Tirole 1999) , and its practical implementation raises concerns about micromanagement and excessive hierarchical control which undermined the idea of market-based alternatives. As an alternative approach, the New Public Management movement suggests focusing on the end results in performance measurement. Performance-based contracting focuses the government's attention on a set of outcomes, allowing the contractors to determine the inputs and the process, and linking the outcomes to monetary rewards (Goldsmith and Eggers 2004; Heinrich 1999) . While this mode of contracting may save costs (Straub 2009) and generate data for resource allocation decisions (Heinrich 1999 ), several problems have been noted. The performance standards are often not well-designed (Heinrich 1999) , the sanctions are rarely executed in response to inadequate performance (Cohen and Eimicke 2008; Van Slyke 2007) , and the democratic process of service delivery may be undermined (Chan and Rosenbloom 2010 Irrespective of the theoretical underpinnings of contractor performance measurement, the latter remains among "the most serious management challenges" facing public managers (Kelman 2002, 312) . Similar to the publicly administered programs, contract outcomes are difficult to quantify, and the pursued goals may be diverging and unclear (Meyers, Riccucci, and Lurie, 2001; Riccucci, 2005) . Cost concerns may supersede the quality considerations, and the performance measures may not reflect the initial goals (Heinrich 1999 ). These problems not only increase the costs of contract management (Sclar 2000) , but also raise the central issue of government contracting that has to do with accountability (Hodge 2000) . As Heinrich writes:
" [u] seful performance management systems will improve programs by assisting public managers to identify poor performers, to follow-up with corrective actions, and to reward good performers and replicate their approaches" (Heinrich 1999, 367) . The question of the main features and components of such useful performance measurement systems remains largely unanswered.
Despite the long history and scope of evaluation efforts, both organizational performance and contract management literatures continue to ask whether performance measurement matters (Ho 2006) . While performance measurement is eventually expected to be translated into better programmatic outcomes and have some political or symbolic effects, the more immediate impact of these practices is expected to be on management (Moynihan 2005; Yang and Hsieh 2007) .
Specifically, performance measurement has been viewed as "the newest method of ensuring accountability" (Zimmerman and Stevens 2006, 315) . While it is often assumed that performance measurement leads to better accountability, few studies actually explored this question. In the broader public sector literature, Ho (2006) and Berman and Wang (2000) suggest that performance measurement leads to improved perceived accountability of government agencies. This question has not been examined in the government contracting literature.
Moreover, no data exist on whether the scope and type of measures may improve accountability effectiveness in government contracts.
The first objective of this study is to determine whether the scope of performance measurement in government contracts can positively influence accountability effectiveness in government contracts. Here, the term "scope" refers to the aggregate of all types of performance measurement activities used to monitor and evaluate a contract. The second objective of this study is exploratory: to examine fifteen distinct performance measurement and monitoring techniques and to evaluate their individual effects on the overall accountability effectiveness in government contracts. As mentioned earlier, government agencies use a variety of performance measurement techniques focusing on costs, quality, impact on service recipients, timeliness, compliance with the laws, fairness, reputation, and customer satisfaction; they collect qualitative and quantitative data, and rely on formal and informal ways of collecting and handling information. Past research found that the so-called higher-order measures, such as efficiency, are more likely to influence management and operation of public organizations rather than the lower-order measures, such as workload and outputs (Ammons and Rivenbark 2008) . Thus, our goal is to determine which performance measures (detailed in the methodology section) are more likely to be associated with the more effective accountability relationships in government contracts. On one hand, the data on contractor performance outcomes, such as the impact of services on the clients, or service quality, should be critical for the agency's ability to evaluate performance, detect deficiencies and correct them. On the other hand, quality and impact data may be hard to obtain and interpret, while using the more straightforward data on costs, compliance with the industry laws, service timeliness and disruptions may be more feasible in order to detect and promptly correct performance problems.
The third objective of this study has to do with how these measures are developed. The literature on performance measurement found evidence of both the government agencies and the private contractors participating in the formation of monitoring systems. Amirkhanyan (2009) found that a variety of collaborative activities are employed by both parties: monitoring officers seek their contractors' input on performance evaluation, meanwhile the contractors develop and
propose new measures and actively negotiate the existing monitoring arrangements. Several other studies also provide evidence of multiple parties participating in the development and implementation of performance measures (Heikkila and Isett 2007; Holzer and Kloby 2005; Romzek and Johnston 2002, 428) . Such participatory mechanisms, though complex and lengthy, ensure that all decision-makers understand the background and the advantages of the measurement process and perceive the monitoring systems as credible (Kravchuk and Schack 1996) . Thus, collaboration between the agency and the contractor in the process of developing performance measurement mechanisms might affect the timeliness and the accuracy of performance data and influence the likelihood of imposing the sanctions and eventually correcting the deficiencies. In this connection, the third objective of this study is to determine whether collaborative practices used to develop performance measurement and monitoring systems positively influence the governments' ability to manage their contracts effectively.
Accountability in contract implementation is a function of many other factors, such as the degree of trust between the agency and the contractor. As detailed in the next section, in this analysis we will control for the effect of several organizational and environmental factors.
METHODS

Data 3
Sixty-nine interviews 4 were administered with government contract managers in state and local government agencies as well as the managers of nonprofit and for-profit organizations contracted by these governments. 5 Jurisdictions under consideration included the District of Columbia, three adjacent counties, and one adjacent state. 6 Searchable open-ended online listings of contracted services were accessed on the procurement office web sites of each jurisdiction. 7 While the stratified random sampling would strengthen the design of this study, the lack of jurisdictionlevel data on the proportional distribution of service fields made this strategy impractical.
Purposive sampling, which involves identification of cases that appear to represent the population with the purpose of capturing a broad range of its characteristics, was appropriate and practical considering the objectives of the study and the data sources.
The sampling procedure started with an extensive review of service contract listings on the procurement web sites of the five examined jurisdictions. I sought to maximize the representation of service fields, service measurability, award amounts, vendor ownership status and other factors. After reviewing over two hundred contracts as well as the organizational structures of each jurisdiction, a preliminary list of service areas was created (shown in Table 1 ).
Contracts for long term and medical care, construction and maintenance, management consulting services, and IT were very prevalent in the listings, and were also prominently represented in the sample. Respondents associated with the relatively infrequent contracts such as translation, parking meter maintenance or animal care were also included, which helped improve the variation of award amounts. This study avoided two-sided representation of contracts, i.e., public and private respondents in this study were not associated with the same contract. While this does not allow us to examine the same contractual arrangements from the two sides, independence of observations in the sample allows us to run a single regression model without biasing the result. A control variable indicating each respondent's public or private status is included in all regressions (coded as one for public respondents and zero for the contractors).
This study uses a non-probability (purposive) sample, and its limitations (e.g., the possibility of over-representing certain service areas) may apply to this analysis. However, by diversifying the service fields, this study makes a contribution to the contracting literature by capturing the richness of performance measurement strategies used by state and local governments. Specifically, it was critical to incorporate contracts falling on the wide spectrum of measurement efforts considering the 15 identified performance measurement tactics detailed below. This would be difficult to achieve in a sample of contracts in the same field. Also, while the sample appears quite heterogeneous, the listings reviewed by the author were also characterized by high levels of diversity. Thus, the sample appears to be representative; however, it is most representative of the five studied jurisdictions 8 .
After two pre-tests, the final sample of thirty-nine public employees and thirty private managers was interviewed by the investigator. Program officers were interviewed in 96% of all public-sector interviews, meanwhile, procurement officers knowledgeable about monitoring procedures were interviewed in the remaining 4% of cases. Government officers who oversaw multiple contracts were asked to discuss the most typical contract they monitored. Each person participated in one interview, which took approximately one hour. The percentage of contracts with for-profit vendors was higher among both public and private respondents: sixty-seven percent of public contract managers discussed a contract with a for-profit organization, with the remaining thirty-three percent discussing a contract with a nonprofit organization. Among private respondents, sixty-three percent were for-profit, while thirty seven percent were nonprofit. As shown in table 1, numerous service fields have been examined, including health and psychological care (e.g., nursing home care or special therapy for incarcerated youth), as well as management consulting (e.g., public program design and evaluation), construction and maintenance (e.g., waste management equipment maintenance) and many others. Appendix A presents six short vignettes describing six typical contracts included in the sample and characterized by high, medium, and low levels of performance measurement and monitoring.
Dependent Variable
Six items, administered to both public and private respondents in the sample, were used to measure the perceived levels of accountability effectiveness. These items are based on the operational definition provided by Johnston (2002, 2005) . Respondents were asked if they (a) strongly agreed, (b) somewhat agreed, (c) somewhat disagreed, and (d) strongly disagreed with each of the following six statements:
1. The contractor accurately complies with our performance measurement requirements. 2. We receive all the necessary information in a timely manner.
3. The information we receive is accurate. 4. We use various sanctions in cases when the contractor fails to provide timely and accurate information on their performance. 5. Performance measures that we use help us reveal inadequate performance of our contractor. 6. In general, we are very effective in terms of our ability to manage and implement this contract.
While originally the sum of these six items was intended to be used as the dependent variable in regression analysis, the obtained scale had an overall raw Cronbach alpha of only 0.6.
Exploratory factors analysis indentified two underlying factors: the first one strongly correlated with items 1, 2, and 3, and the second one with items 5 and 6 10 . Based on this analysis, three dependent variables were created: a). Contractor complies by providing timely and accurate information, an ordinal 12-point scale, representing the sum of items 1 through 3 listed above. b). Government reveals problems and effectively manages the contract, an ordinal 8 point scale, representing the sum of items 5 and 6 listed above. c). Government uses sanctions, representing item 4 above.
Importantly, this research focuses on the managers' perceived accountability effectiveness.
Certainly, accountability effectiveness is independent of the agencies' and vendors' perceptions of thereof, but this study focuses on the respondents' subjective evaluation of this phenomenon.
Independent Variables
The central independent variables of interest are the performance measurement practices used in the course of contract monitoring as well as the collaborative practices used to develop these measures. As shown in Appendix B, respondents were asked to recall if the government agency "collected, monitored, or evaluated information" on fifteen distinct aspects of contractor performance such as costs, quality, workload, impact on clients, customer satisfaction and several others. Past studies have effectively used dichotomous (i.e., "yes" and "no") response categories to study performance measurement capacity in the contracting setting (Brown and Potoski 2003) . In this study, positive responses to each of the fifteen items, indicating that a particular aspect of performance was indeed evaluated by the government, were coded as one.
Negative and the "don't know/don't recall" answers were coded as zero. In addition to the fifteen variables measuring each of these performance measurement practices, the sum of all fifteen items was calculated for each respondent. This variable -the number of performance measurement techniques used -reflects the scope of performance measurement in each contact.
Six questions helped identify the collaborative practices used by the government and the contractor in performance measurement. Questions 2 through 7, shown in Appendix B, were used to create six dummy variables (asking for input, contractor negotiation, input incorporated, communication affects performance, contractor seeking clarification, and government seeking clarification), each coded as one for affirmative responses. Variable collaborative performance measurement index, the sum of these six items, was used in the regression analysis.
Analysis
Since the three dependent variables were ordinal, ordered logit was used to examine the effect of performance measurement and their collaborative development on the accountability effectiveness measures. A set of other controls measuring important organizational and environmental factors was included in each model (described in Appendix C). For each of the three dependent variables, sixteen regression models were obtained, using the following process:
In the first model, the number of performance measurement techniques used was used as the central explanatory variable. In subsequent fifteen models, the number of performance measurement techniques used was replaced with each of the fifteen performance measures.
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Regressions obtained with one of the three dependent variables -government uses sanctions -had low overall statistical power and this model was excluded from the analysis.
The two remaining measures of accountability effectiveness -contractor complies by providing timely and accurate information and government reveals problems and effectively manages the contract -were statistically significant and produced interesting results. Table 2 shows the prevalence of each measure in the sample. Consistent with the reviewed literature, the numbers vary considerably. Measurement of quality, timeliness, continuity, vendors' workload, and using informal monitoring is quite common. Less common are the contracts focusing on client satisfaction and the impact of services on clients, as well as those using quantitative and qualitative performance indicators. Finally, very few respondents reported monitoring cost-effectiveness, 13 reputation, ability to provide services without discrimination, specify detailed procedures for service delivery, or tailor performance measurement to the contracted organization. Notably, government respondents are more likely to report the use of each measure than the contractors. Several arguments have been proposed to explain these findings (Amirkhanyan 2009 (see table 3 ). First, respondents who reported that their contracts involved monitoring service costs reported significantly higher perceived levels of contractor compliance and information timeliness and accuracy (Model 1). Similarly, monitoring service disruptions had a positive effect on the dependent variable (Model 2). On the other hand, monitoring service quality as well as monitoring contractors informally had a negative association with contractor compliance and information timeliness and accuracy (Models 3 and 4). Importantly, collaborative performance measurement index was insignificant in all models. Among the control variables, "hard" services were associated with reduced contractor compliance and information quality. Working with a contractor that has a unique expertise and was selected using a competitive bidding process improved perceived compliance and timely/accurate information, while dynamic environments and use of performance information "self-reported" by the contractors had a negative effect on the dependent variable.
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FINDINGS
Finally, public rather than private respondents and those with more extensive contract management experience were less likely to perceive higher levels of perceived contract accountability effectiveness. This is a key finding suggesting that government program managers and contractors give systematically different accounts to a third party about the degree to which they felt the contractors were being held accountable by government agencies.
Regression analysis pertaining to the second dependent variable -government reveals problems and effectively manages the contract -is presented in tables 6a and 6b. As explained above, the dependent variable was regressed, consecutively, on the total number of performance measures and each of the fifteen individual performance measures (along with the control variables). This analysis also suggests that while some measures have a positive association with the dependent variable, others have a negative effect. The overall scope of performance measurement -the sum of all measures -had a positive effect on the government's ability to reveal problems and effectively manage contracts (Model 5). Measuring impact of services on clients and service equitability, measuring service timeliness and disruptions, as well as specifying the details of service provision had a positive association with the dependent variable (models 6, 8, 9, 10, and 11). Meanwhile, measuring client satisfaction and monitoring informally had a negative effect on the government's ability to reveals problems and effectively manage contracts (models 7 and 12). Similar to models 1 through 4, collaborative development of performance measurement practices had no effect on the second measure of perceived accountability effectiveness. Nonprofit status of contracted organizations reduced government's perceived ability to reveal problems and effectively manage contracts. The contractors' financial dependency was associated with a lower perceived accountability effectiveness. Monitoring done directly by government agencies through inspections, observations, and other methods appeared to improve perceived accountability. Government's in-house professional capacity also significantly improved accountability effectiveness. In two regressions, relationship length had a positive association with the dependent variable. Finally, in two models (9 and 10), public sector respondents had a significantly lower perception of accountability effectiveness than their private counterparts.
DISCUSSION
Performance measurement activities are complex tasks that require specialized knowledge and significant resources. Therefore, understanding the benefits of these activities is useful to ensure a more efficient use of government funds. This study focuses on identifying specific performance measurement approaches that impact government agency's ability to keep its contractors accountable. It attempts to address a question raised in the literature: "Is monitoring always good and the more the better?" (Yang, Hsieh, and Li 2009 681) . Our findings suggest that the answer to this question is not simple. Some measures appear to have no significant impact on government's ability to collect good data and effectively manage contacts.
Furthermore, while some measures have a positive significant effect on perceived accountability effectiveness, others have a negative impact. Notably, the overall scope of performance measurement does in fact improve public agency's ability to reveal problems and effectively manage contracts. More diverse performance measurement activities -those involving multiple and complementary ways of evaluating the contractors' work -appear to improve the agency's ability to detect performance problems and have a perception of effective contract management.
While this does not necessarily suggest that "complete" contracting is the answer, it certainly means that by diligently investing in multi-dimensional, diverse, and complex performance measurement systems the agencies will receive a payoff in terms of improved perceived accountability. This, perhaps, is the most important finding of this study relevant for the practitioners: it suggests the importance of investing more time and effort in the design of multifaceted performance measurement systems. Nonetheless, some performance measures can evidently be more effective than others.
When examining the timeliness and accuracy of information provided by the contractor as well as the contractor's propensity to comply with the requirements, monitoring service costs has a positive impact. Privatization in the U.S. has been promoted primarily as a cost-cutting tool, and it is not surprising that the examination of costs plays a central role in the oversight process. While many government agencies may lack the capacity to effectively evaluate quality and other non-financial aspects of performance, the review of financial data is a more traditional and straightforward contract management procedure. Qualitative data provided by the respondents in this study supports this assumption -several respondents described receiving regular financial reporting from the contractor as a key element of contract evaluation -one that essentially ensures that the contract continues as intended.
Notably, monitoring quality has a negative effect of the respondent's perception of the contractor's compliance and timely and accurate information sharing. This may suggest a number of things: a lack of capacity to collect data and evaluate service quality (Gianakis 2002) , poorly designed quality monitoring tools, as well as ambiguous, unsatisfying or contradictory information on service quality (Frederickson and Frederickson 2006; Kravchuk and Schack 1996; Nicholson-Crotty, Theobald, Nicholson-Crotty 2006; Radin 2006) . The general performance measurement literature suggests that broad and ambiguous objectives of public programs often make it difficult to measure success, and they introduce political tradeoffs between multiple measures of quality, costs and others (Amirkhanyan, Kim and Lambright 2008; Blasi 2002; Callahan and Kloby 2007; Frederickson and Frederickson 2006; Kravchuk and Schack 1996) . Obviously, it is easier to receive timely and accurate data on costs, than on quality. In this connection, several authors note that performance measurement is often inaccurate due to the public managers' failure to invest into long-term and continuous evaluation that can provide the "helicopter view" of performance (Blasi 2002; Bouckaert and Peters 2002; Courty and Marschke 2007) .
Similarly, this study finds that the use of informal monitoring techniques in the oversight process has a negative effect on both measures of perceived accountability effectiveness:
receiving timely and accurate performance information and using it to reveal problems. These findings are important for the discourse on trust-based relational contract management. The use of informal monitoring may suggest a lack of formally designed oversight systems. Our findings may also reflect respondents' frustration with the inadequacy of informal contract monitoring tools. DeHoog (1990) warns that cooperative contract management models that are based on trust and informal ties may become more important than programmatic success, limit objectivity and lead to collusion. Our findings may also suggest a missing variable in the model. Some unobserved and potentially problematic characteristics of the contractor may prompt the public agency to supplement the formal monitoring tools with the informal ones. This study suggests that these strategies do not appear to improve perceived accountability effectiveness.
Notably, the monitoring of service timeliness and disruptions is also important for both measures of effective contract accountability. Both of these items pertain to the process of service delivery. They are relatively easy to track and may also be easy to interpret. A failure to fix a parking meter undermines the timeliness of several other work orders, and clearly suggests the contractor's failure to perform well. Many contracts in our sample involved monitoring systems (some computerized) that would promptly inform the government agency of any service disruptions. This type of data serves as a first signal of a problem and is therefore critical to effectively understand the status of service delivery and to correct deficiencies. Importantly, these findings suggest that monitoring some aspects of service delivery process rather than the outcomes can provide valuable information for accountability effectiveness which would not necessarily be achieved in the typical performance-based contracts.
Regression analysis suggests that assessing the impact of service delivery on clients is positively associated with the perception of effective contract monitoring. This measure is designed to detect the outcomes or the end result of the contractors' activities. This information is what many external and internal stakeholders ultimately care about in contract implementation. For instance, the parents' dissatisfaction with the quality of care their children receive at a child care center will have important implications for the contracting Head Start Agency's contract management practices. A nursing facility's failure to ensure high-quality long term care (e.g., follow practices geared towards minimizing the prevalence of bed sores or the use of psychotropic drugs) will be the primary factors to be considered by the government agency while managing its contractor. Thus, it is not surprising that understanding the impact of services on the clients is helpful in effective management and implementation of these contracts.
In the light of these findings, however, it is interesting that evaluation of client satisfaction actually has a negative effect on the dependent variable. On possible interpretation of these findings may be that while the data on client impact may be generated by the public agency and reflects some broader impacts and implications of service delivery (e.g., general trends in public health improvement, environmental conditions, and others), client satisfaction surveys may reflect some discontent and complaints related to service delivery. Receiving data directly from the clients (i.e., from a separate stakeholder) may certainly complicate the overall perception of contract management effectiveness.
Importantly, evaluating whether or not services were delivered in a fair and equitable manner is also positively associated with the perception of government's ability to reveal performance problems and effectively manage contracts. The use of this measure may reflect some attention to the core public sector values of fair distribution of resources and may suggest higher levels of commitment to good oversight among these public agencies. Assessing fairness, access and equitability of service delivery may be a signal of mission-orientation and better articulation of contract priorities which in turn improves accountability.
Finally, specifying the detailed process for service delivery -providing directions on precisely how, when and by whom services should be provided -is a performance monitoring practice associated with better perceived accountability. In this connection, Behn (2003, 594) writes about performance measures: "Do not be fooled. These guidelines are really requirements, and these requirements are designed to control. The measurement of compliance with these requirements is the mechanism of control." This is especially true when an agency attempts to maximize the specification of service delivery parameters. Thus, government agency's propensity to "control" its contractors by developing a more complete specification of how, when and by whom the service should be delivered improves the contractor's compliance and the agency's ability to obtain clear and informative data, detect problems, and act upon them.
Process specification also undoubtedly reflects a higher level of in-house service delivery proficiency which allows the agency to spell out the expectations and effectively monitor their attainment.
This study finds that the way performance measures are created (i.e., whether they are created unilaterally by a government agency and imposed upon a contractor, or are a result of negotiations and clarifications) has no effect on accountability effectiveness. Thus, performance measures, no matter how they are created, can serve as useful tools that can help generate useful information on performance and prompt the agency to use sanctions. While not undermining the value of collaborative practices in the course of contracting, this study suggests that an agency may unilaterally develop and enforce a set of measurement techniques that would help achieve higher levels of contractor perceived accountability.
This paper does not argue that only seven measures are useful in improving accountability or that other measures are of no value. In fact, the findings pertaining to the scope of performance measurement suggest that the more measurement is done the more accountability can be achieved. Rather, this analysis shows that different measures can have a different effect on the managerial outcome considered here. This analysis also suggests that the process of performance measurement should not be static. It is hard to develop a perfect system at the onset of the contracting relationship. At that point, a greater scope of performance measurement may be advisable. This will ensure higher accountability while the contracting agency develops a better understanding of the most optimal performance measurement "package." The latter may be different for different service fields and levels of government. Thus, the findings of this study provide further motivation for contract managers to work continuously on improving their performance measurement and monitoring practices.
Results of this analysis also suggest that, aside from the scope and the type of performance measurement activities, the perceived level of accountability may be determined by a range of other factors. First, government agencies involved in direct monitoring of their contractors -inspections, observations, or site visits -are able to achieve greater accountability even after controlling for service measurability. On the other hand, data that are self-reported by the contractor has the opposite effect. This is hardly surprising: the delegation of monitoring to a vendor or a third party can produce informational silos or exacerbated principal-agent issues.
Meanwhile, direct monitoring often increases the likelihood of developing informal ties, having first-hand knowledge of the implementation process (often, by virtue of being "on site" with the contractor), and eventually results in more accurate and timely reporting and correction of problems. Similarly, relationship length allows both parties to develop a common language and to create a shared understanding of the contractor's capabilities and the government's propensity to impose sanctions -these factors can facilitate a more cooperative contract evaluation process.
Potentially, this provides some evidence on the effect of stability and relationships (though, not necessarily informal) on the effectiveness of oversight. Interestingly, we find that nonprofit status of the contractors is associated with a significant decrease in perceived accountability effectiveness. On the one hand, nonprofit organizations are often perceived are more trustworthy than their for-profit counterparts due to their mission-driven nature and the fact that they re-invest profits towards their organizational missions (Hansmann, 1987) . These and other factors may decrease their opportunistic behavior and increase compliance and cooperation in the oversight process. Amirkhanyan (2009) finds that nonprofit service contractors are more likely to collaborate with public agencies in the oversight process, and Van Slyke (2009) suggests that nonprofits may be initially perceived as more trustworthy. On the other hand, contracting research suggests that public managers are aware of the performance problems, lack of management capacity, financial abuses, and political behavior prevalent in the nonprofit sector (Arenson 1995; Grimaldi and Trescott 2008; Reaves 2001; Hansmann 1986; Johnston and Romzek 1999; Prager 1994; Rose-Ackerman 1996) . Our findings may suggest lower capacity of nonprofit organizations to comply with the monitoring process, and the nature of services delivered by nonprofit organizations may be characterized by a higher degree of complexity and ambiguity that also undermines accountability effectiveness.
Finally, one of the most puzzling findings of this analysis pertains to the negative effect of the contractors' financial dependency on the perception of accountability effectiveness. One would expect that the contractors' dependency on a single contract would translate into their willingness to cooperate in the evaluation process which would eventually improve the likelihood of providing timely and accurate information and resolving performance problems.
What our findings may suggest is that the financial importance of a contract gives some vendors an incentive to reduce transparency and evade government oversight. When more is at stake for a contractor, the situation may create additional tensions and conflict, and the contractors may be reluctant to cooperate out of fear of sanctions. Contractors that are dependent on a specific government contract rather than those relying on diversified revenues sources, are also more likely to be smaller and less professionalized which may affect the perception of accountability effectiveness.
Another intriguing finding pertains to the negative effect of "hard" or easily measurable services on the contractors' compliance with the monitoring, as well as with the timely and accurate information provided to the government agency. This finding may in fact imply some procedural distinctions associated with the "hard" (i.e, tangible or more easily measurable)
services. In the qualitative portion of the interviews, several public managers discussed direct supervision and inspections as important monitoring techniques in the fields of construction, maintenance, waste removal and others. Potentially, quality of information reported by the contractors in these fields may be inadequate and more direct inspections are used in such contracts. Service type does not, however, affect the government's ability to reveal problems and effectively monitor these contracts.
While this study contributes to our understanding of which performance measurement strategies matter for contract implementation, several unanswered questions remain. First, this study focuses on the effect of performance measurement on one aspect of managerial effectiveness -contractor accountability. The latter is important, as Cohen and Eimicke (2008, 155) argue: "innovation and customer needs may very well be less important than accountability and transparency." Nonetheless, public agencies pursue multiple goals when measuring organizational performance (Smith and Larimer 2004) . Therefore, future studies should assess the impact of performance measurement on diverse programmatic and stakeholder outcomes (including creativity and customer needs). In particular, this will allow us to see which measures are more suitable for "motivating", "celebrating", "learning" and "improving", and for achieving other organizational goals. Measures found to be less important for contractor accountability may in fact be critical for goal establishment, budgeting, motivation, promotion, and learning (Behn 2003; Ho 2006) . Agencies pursuing performance measurement should clarify the objectives of their efforts and refine their contract monitoring systems depending on these objectives. Additional and related research directions include comparing the vendors' and the purchasers' perceptions of accountability effectiveness on the same contracts with a third assessment done by a researcher. Understanding the relationship between these perceptual measures of accountability effectiveness and actual program outcomes is important to adequately assess the importance of performance monitoring efforts. More importantly, it is an open question still not just whether perceived accountability effectiveness is related to "program outcomes" but also whether actual accountability effectiveness is related to either of those variables.
Furthermore, while this research approaches the use of performance measures as a dichotomy, past literature suggests that such efforts may have different levels of intensity and accuracy (Blasi 2002) . Future studies should investigate not only the scope but also the intensity and accuracy of various performance measurement approaches, and examine their effect on the programmatic outcomes. Specifically, large-scope performance measurement may allow public managers to effectively evaluate contractor performance, but it can also divert the contractor's resources and attention away from program implementation towards regulatory compliance, and may eventually undermine service outcomes. In addition, while this manuscript tests the direct effects of various performance measures, these practices may not only have different direct effects, but also interact together to have interactive effects. Finally, different performance measures (e.g., service disruptions) may have a different meaning and relevance in different fields, and therefore is it important to investigate how performance measures are applied for certain goods and services with similar production and consumption characteristics.
APPENDIX A. Mini-case studies illustrating specific services across sectors. Contract A is delivered by a homeless shelter monitored by a county government using monthly expenditures, client age, gender, ethnicity, length of stay, employment, income, savings upon arrival and departure, and data on applications and admissions. All fifteen measures listed in the questionnaire, except timeliness and customer satisfaction, are used in the monitoring process. The contractor submits reports and participates in monthly sessions to discuss programmatic issues and the state of homelessness in the county. Recently, the reporting system has been enhanced with new information technology. Since the contractor feels the new system fails to incorporate descriptive information about their work and long-term client outcomes, they voluntarily provide this information in their informal communication with the county.
Contract D is with a for-profit organization performing maintenance of solid waste management equipment. The monitoring officer prepares a detailed daily list of tasks for the contractor, directly observes the contractor's work, daily selects a sample of trucks for a closer inspection using a special evaluation checklist developed for each type of repair, and seeks the truck drivers' feedback to determine their satisfaction with the quality of repairs and to illuminate any unaddressed problems. With the exception of the contractor's reputation and equitable access to services, all performance measures used in the interview guide are utilized by the government agency. Recently, the government conducted a longitudinal study comparing the current and the previous contractors' performance and found some improvement in the incidence of performance problems. Contract B is for nursing and medical services for the juveniles referred by a local correctional department. Through regular reports and formal meetings, the monitoring officer tracks the timeliness, the costs, the workload, as well as multiple other quantitative indicators and qualitative accounts of the clients' health status and the types of services provided. The officer does not use any informal channels of communication to monitor care. He does not examine the contractor's reputation, client satisfaction with services, or whether services are delivered equitably, and according to the laws and regulations in the field. The officer also argues he is unable to detect the short-term or long-term effects of care on the client health.
Contract E provides nursing services for incarcerated children. The monitoring officer maintains extensive communication with the contractor, but is frustrated that most information originates from self-reporting or whistle-blowing. Timeliness, disruptions in service delivery, and the contractor's workload are among the monitored aspects of performance. Indirect measures of care quality are also used. No consistent assessment of costs or correspondence of care provision to the regulations in the field is conducted. Similarly, client satisfaction, equitable access to care, and the contractor's reputation are not assessed. Monitoring officer points to his inability to evaluate "how the contractor does due diligence," and cites the need to reiterate contract requirements due to the contractor's staff turnover. Contract C is delivered by a nonprofit foundation that facilitates quality improvement and develops various population evaluation frameworks for a local government health department. The contractor is not aware of any formal evaluation of quality or any other aspect of their work, with the exception of timeliness of submitted quality-improvement materials and continuity in their work. Communication between the agency and the contractor focuses on eliminating the factors that hinder the contractor's ability to provide the expected deliverables on time (e.g., those dealing with receiving the necessary data from the government agency in order to develop quality assessment and improvement strategies and tools).
Contract F is a small for-profit therapy program conducting substance abuse counseling. When asked about government monitoring, the contractor notes "[a]s hard as it is to believe, they do nothing." The contractor submits brief reports with a basic overview of its work, however there is no feedback or indication that these reports are reviewed. As a part of internal evaluation the contractor conducts professional client assessment the results of which are voluntarily shared with the government agency (also, with no feedback). Communication is generally initiated by the contractor who raises concerns regarding specific clients' noncompliance. The contractor indicated that only one of fifteen items is used by the agency: the agency interacts with the clients and obtains some informal feedback.
APPENDIX B Interview Questions Utilized to Examine the Prevalence and the Process of Collaboration
1. Today I would like us to talk about performance evaluation and measurement, specifically, about any kind of information that you might use to make sure that your contractor is complying with your expectations and doing their job well. Some of these performance measures can be more formal and quantitative (e.g., reporting the number of service units produced every week). Other measures can be more informal (e.g., informally discussing service provision details). For the following questions please choose one of the following answers: (1) yes, (2) (A). Government Respondent. In the data, records pertaining to government monitoring officers were assigned the value of 1, while respondents representing the vendors were assigned the value of 0. We are here to discuss the contract with ________. Could you describe for me, very briefly, what kind of services does this contractor provide? (B). Hard Services. Responses were categorized into "hard" (easily measurable) services: IT, construction, maintenance, public works, planting and plant control, food supply and quality monitoring, animal care, janitorial, translation, and recreational (camps, dance lessons). "Soft" (hard-to-measure) services: long-term care, medical, nursing care, health management, mental health, psychological consultation, arts therapy, programs for women and children, consulting, evaluation and training, criminal justice, animal care, substance abuse, and homelessness (dummy variable). Using Wilson's classification, "hard" services also corresponded to those provided by coping and procedural agencies, while "soft" ones corresponded to s-called craft agencies (no production agencies were involved in the analysis). Some contractors' financial health depends solely on the government contract. Other organizations are more fiscally independent, and rely on other sources of revenues. Is your contractor (a) financially very dependent on your funding, (b) somewhat dependent, (c) somewhat independent, (d) financially very independent, (e) don't know. 
(C). Vendor's financial dependency on the contract
